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ABSTRACT 
 
 In contemporary philosophy of mind, the issue of consciousness has taken center stage. 
Broadly speaking, those who deal with consciousness fall into two camps: those who prioritize 
empirical work and those who favor conceptual investigation. One prominent argument has 
served to deepen the divide: the argument for the possibility of zombies. In this paper I intend to 
examine closely this argument, as it’s presented by David Chalmers, and some of the attempts to 
discredit it. In so doing, I present some of my own arguments against it, as well as the claim that 
if it’s sound, then materialism is false. Finally, I present a sketch of a new way of thinking about 
consciousness that would, I argue, guard against the threat—real or merely apparent—of 
arguments such as the zombie-argument. 
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 Introduction 
 Daniel Dennett says that "consciousness is just about the last surviving mystery" (Dennett 
1991, 21). David Chalmers echoes this sentiment: "Consciousness is the biggest mystery. It may 
be the largest outstanding obstacle in our quest for a scientific understanding of the universe" 
(Chalmers 1994, xi). Owen Flanagan, perhaps deliberately understatedly, writes, "The very idea 
of consciousness materializing, of subjectivity being realized in the activity of a physical 
organism, is puzzling" (Flanagan 1992, xi). And even Francis Crick, one of the pioneers in 
attempts to explain consciousness scientifically, admits that "consciousness appears so 
mysterious" (Crick 1994, 13). There are countless other statements which would highlight the 
odd nature of consciousness. It has been argued that anyone who wishes to take consciousness 
seriously has no choice but to admit the fact that consciousness is weird. To deny its weirdness is 
not to face up to the "hard" problem of consciousness.1 
 Consciousness is puzzling, mysterious, perhaps even an obstacle in our way toward 
understanding the universe. Until the last three decades or so, consciousness has been ignored. 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, people like William James started to ask questions like 
“What is consciousness?” But these kinds of questions were by and large cast aside as irrelevant 
during the first half of the twentieth century. Attempts to explain the mental then primarily 
focused on behavior, or identity relations between the mental and physical, or causal relations 
between inputs and outputs. The what-it's-like aspect of the mental was often considered not a 
useful subject for study.  
                                                 
1 (Chalmers 1994, xii) 
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 But consciousness is now front-and-center in the philosophy of mind. Some embrace the 
mystery, opting to deny the possibility of our ever figuring out how consciousness fits in with 
our physical explanations.2 Others have determined that the mystery must be illusory,3 even if 
this fact has not been demonstrated; thus, it can safely be ignored. Scientific research will reign 
at the end of the day. It is up to us not to become entangled in the merely apparent 
mysteriousness of consciousness. Generally, opponents of those who hold this position object 
that these skeptics regarding consciousness are explaining consciousness away, rather than 
providing a scientific explanation of the phenomenal feel of experience. 
 There is a third kind of position to take—an intermediate position between defeatist 
mysterianism and skepticism. Of course, this "third position" cannot be described in a way that 
does justice to the very heterogeneous individual positions which are held. There are many 
theories which fall somewhere between the two poles. Perhaps one unifying characteristic of all 
these theories would be, however, a constant, unflagging consideration of consciousness and 
conscious experience. Whereas the mysterian position accepts the mysteriousness of 
consciousness at face-value and then gives up further exploration, and skepticism briefly fixes its 
attention on the phenomenal feel of experience and decides to ignore it for the sake of science, 
the intermediate position accepts that consciousness must be adequately explained, without being 
explained away, all the while admitting that there don't seem to be established ways to complete 
such an explanation. Thus, for this position, the mystery of consciousness is real, not merely 
apparent, but an explanation of consciousness is not, in principle, inaccessible to us. 
                                                 
2 See (McGinn 1989) for a good example of this kind of position. 
3 Notice that Crick admits only that consciousness appears mysterious. 
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 As we have already noted, the intermediate position is marked by diversity. There are 
those who believe that consciousness may be explained empirically, without much need for 
armchair conceptual analyses. Consciousness will be explained by science in some way—it 
won't need thought-experiments to guide it along its way. And there are those who still hope to 
explain consciousness primarily through conceptual analysis, i.e., by deriving truths about 
consciousness from closely inspecting the conceptual distinctions we make when we consider 
phenomenal experience. 
 One thought-experiment which has proved to be quite divisive among those holding the 
intermediate position is the argument for the possibility of zombies. While its history extends 
back thirty years, at least to Robert Kirk's seminal paper "Sentience and Behaviour," its 
popularity today may be attributed to David Chalmers and his book The Conscious Mind. 
Zombie-arguments have served a number of purposes—as an argument for epiphenomenalism,4 
an argument against functionalism, etc. Chalmers, however, uses his argument for the possibility 
of zombies as a way to refute materialism. If zombies are possible, he argues, then there is 
something in the actual world that is not physical—consciousness. Thus, not every object in the 
world is material. Therefore, materialism is false. 
 One can see here, then, just how significant the argument for zombies may be. If it 
succeeds, as Chalmers intends it to, then the larger argument against materialism succeeds. And 
if the argument against materialism succeeds, then Chalmers has shown that science, in its 
present state of trying to explain everything in physical terms, using strictly physical laws, will 
                                                 
4 See (Perry 2001) for a discussion of Chalmers’s zombie-argument as it relates to epiphenomenalism. See (Seager 
unpublished) for a reasonably good argument against a position such as Perry’s.  
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fail to deal adequately with consciousness. Thus, science would have to be adapted to this 
purpose. Science would have to be overhauled, in order for it to be able to deal with 
consciousness.  
 It might seem to some utterly amazing that all of this can be demonstrated via something 
as abstract as a thought-experiment conducted from an armchair. Indeed, this lies at the heart of 
the divisiveness of the zombie-argument. 
 This paper has two purposes. The first will be to examine the zombie-argument and the 
place it occupies in Chalmers's argument against materialism. I intend to show that there are 
problems with the zombie-argument inherently, as well as the way it's used against materialism. 
The second purpose of this paper will be to present a deflationist description of consciousness, 
which, I will argue, allows for a more universal agreement about what we mean by the term 
“consciousness” and will allow more success in future investigations of conscious experience. I 
will further argue that utilizing the deflationist description of consciousness will also allow us to 
escape the clutch that the zombie-argument seems to have on us. As a full presentation of my 
deflationist view would require much more space than I have available in this paper, I will only 
be providing a sketch of my view, enough to make my point concerning zombie-arguments.  
 The final position I will take will obviously fall on the empirical side of the intermediate 
position. Science will eventually be able to explain consciousness, but it won’t do so by 
explaining consciousness away. But until we get past having to respond to thought-experiments 
which try to take shortcuts to answers science should, in time, be able to provide, our time and 
effort will be wasted on speculation, rather than the hard work of research. 
 
5 
The Zombie-Argument 
 
 Chalmers presents his argument for the logical possibility of zombies in his chapter 
dealing with reductive explanation. He argues first that the logical possibility of zombies 
demonstrates that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical. In a subsequent 
chapter, however, he refers to the zombie-argument in relation to his argument against 
materialism. His argument against the logical supervenience of consciousness upon the physical 
and his argument against materialism are closely related, but distinct. The goal of this section is 
to examine the zombie-argument in relation to the argument against materialism. Thus, we will 
have to draw from the zombie-argument as presented in the earlier chapter, but we will be 
considering it only in connection to the anti-materialist argument. 
 First, Chalmers provides the definition of “zombie” which he will be using. He defines a 
zombie—specifically, his own zombie-twin—thus: “someone or something physically identical 
to me … but lacking conscious experiences altogether. … This creature is molecule for molecule 
identical to me, and identical in all the low-level properties postulated by a completed physics, 
but he lacks conscious experience entirely” (Chalmers 1996, 94). Thus, Chalmers’s zombie-twin 
will be functionally, behaviorally, and psychologically identical to Chalmers. He just won’t be 
having any phenomenal experience in cases where Chalmers himself would. 
 Second, Chalmers reasons from his being able to describe this zombie-twin to his being 
able to conceive of the zombie-twin. He claims that what he has described is coherent—there is 
no contradiction involved in what he has said. Moreover, his being able to conceive of this 
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zombie-twin implies that it is logically possible. He writes, “In some ways an assertion of this 
logical possibility comes down to a brute intuition … Almost everybody, it seems to me, is 
capable of conceiving of this possibility” (Chalmers 1996, 96). He then claims that some who 
deny the possibility do so only to make a theory come out right, when, in fact, the theory should 
conform to the possibility. 
 So, at this point it would seem that Chalmers’s argument for the logical possibility of 
zombies consists of two premises: (1) if zombies are conceivable, then zombies are logically 
possible; and (2) zombies are conceivable. The conclusion then is that zombies are logically 
possible. This I will call his positive argument for zombies. He has given us reasons to accept his 
premises; he does not expect us to accept his conclusion independently of his premises. Thus, he 
seems to believe that these premises establish his conclusion. 
 He then goes on to claim that there is really only one viable way for an opponent to 
object. The opponent would “claim that in describing the zombie world as a zombie world, we 
are misapplying the concepts, and that in fact there is a conceptual contradiction lurking in the 
description” (Chalmers 1996, 99). He does not think that objections regarding the reliability of 
conceivability arguments present many problems. He believes his first premise is pretty solid. He 
concedes that someone might object to premise 2 above, but he does not suspect anyone will 
present a convincing argument. He reiterates that he “can detect no internal incoherence; I have a 
clear picture of what I am conceiving when I conceive of a zombie” (Chalmers 1996, 99). Thus, 
he feels pretty good about the second premise, as well. 
 In addition to the positive argument for zombies, I would argue that Chalmers also puts 
forth a second argument for zombies. As we shall see, Chalmers needs the logical possibility of 
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zombies in order for his argument against materialism to succeed. He provides the positive 
argument above only as a means of establishing the logical possibility of zombies. There is also a 
sense, however, in which he argues that zombies are logically possible unless proven otherwise. 
He writes, “Arguing for a logical possibility is not entirely straightforward. … I confess that the 
logical possibility of zombies seems … obvious to me.” He then goes on to say, “In general, a 
certain burden of proof lies on those who claim that a given description is logically impossible. 
… If no reasonable analysis of the terms in question points toward a contradiction, or even 
makes the existence of a contradiction plausible, then there is a natural assumption in favor of 
logical possibility” (Chalmers 1996, 96). Thus, he argues, zombies are logically possible until 
someone establishes that they are not. 
 Now, someone might object to my distinction of the positive and burden-of-proof 
arguments. It might be argued that the burden of proof he discusses is the same burden of proof 
on an opponent who objects to the second premise of what I am calling the positive argument. 
The contradiction which, he maintains, must be produced in order for zombies to be considered 
logically impossible would then be the same contradiction called for in connection with the 
second premise, the conceivability claim. 
 I would respond by saying that if what I am calling two arguments is indeed only one, 
then there does not seem to be any reason to point out that the burden of proof rests with 
Chalmers’s opponent. If the entire argument for zombies consists of the two premises regarding 
conceivability and possibility, then it would be painfully obvious that the burden of proof rests 
on his opponent. But he clearly feels the need to point out the fact that the burden of proof is 
with his opponent. Also, why would he implement a strategy of, at one moment, providing two 
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premises in order to support his conclusion, and at another moment, claiming that his conclusion 
should be presumed true, unless proven false? It seems to me that these are two independent sets 
of support for his one conclusion. I would argue that this suggests that there are really two 
arguments, instead of only one.  
 Chalmers even suggests this in the text. After presenting his view that the burden of proof 
lies with his opponent, and before he discusses conceivability as a guide to possibility, he writes, 
“That being said, there are some positive things that proponents of logical possibility can do to 
bolster their case” (Chalmers 1996, 96). 
 There is very little attention paid to the burden-of-proof argument, perhaps because there 
is still so much to be said about the positive argument. Nonetheless, the burden-of-proof 
argument, we will see, is very important in relation to the argument against materialism. 
 So, we have seen how Chalmers presents the zombie-argument. Now all we have left to 
do is see how it operates in the anti-materialist argument. We can see that in the following—
Chalmers’s argument against materialism—the conclusion of the zombie-argument acts as a 
premise (Premise 2): 
 
1. In our world, there are conscious experiences. 
2. There is a logically possible world physically identical to ours, in which the positive 
facts about consciousness in our world do not hold. 
3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are further facts about our world, over and above 
the physical facts. 
4. So, materialism is false. (Chalmers 1996, 123) 
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His reasoning is that, if the zombie-world is physically identical to the actual world, but different 
in another respect (there is no consciousness in the zombie-world), then there is an extra fact 
about the actual world which cannot be a physical fact. “The character of our world is not 
exhausted by the character supplied by the physical facts; there is extra character due to the 
presence of consciousness” (Chalmers 1996, 123). Thus, not all of the facts about our world are 
physical. Therefore, materialism is false. 
 One thing we should note at this point is the strategy Chalmers employs in the above 
argument. It is an argument whose premises are strictly conceptual, except perhaps for premise 
1. But premise 1 is, for the most part, uncontroversial. Premise 2 is a version of the conclusion of 
the zombie-argument, itself purely conceptual. Premise 3 depends on premise 2. And all three 
are needed in order to establish the empirical conclusion that there is at least one kind of thing in 
the world that is non-physical. But notice that with our assent to each premise, we are carried 
inexorably closer to the conclusion. If we assent to each and every premise, it seems we have no 
choice but to accept the conclusion. Indeed, we are forced into accepting the anti-materialist 
conclusion if we accept each premise. This is a characteristic of Chalmers’s argument we should 
note now, because it becomes relevant later. 
 Something else we should note now for future reference is who Chalmers’s intended 
audience is. It doesn’t seem to be dualists, at least not primarily. If it were, then he would 
certainly be expending a lot of unnecessary energy in order to construct an argument which 
forces its conclusion for an audience who already accepts the conclusion. The intended audience 
probably won’t be dogmatic materialists, either. The argument against materialism relies on the 
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zombie-argument and the latter relies heavily on particular intuitions which allow for the 
possibility of materialism’s being false. Dogmatic materialists simply won’t have the appropriate 
intuitions.  
 What about open-minded materialists? By this phrase, I mean those who believe in causal 
closure, scientific explanations, lack of overdetermination, etc., but who might still be unsatisfied 
with a purely physical reduction of consciousness. In a way, Chalmers himself seems to be an 
example of someone who has been convinced away from materialism, in spite of his belief in 
science. Much of his book focuses on the potentiality of discovering psychophysical laws which 
will allow for consciousness as a non-physical fact to be incorporated into science. Thus, it 
seems plausible that the open-minded materialist is an intended target. 
 And then there is, of course, the agnostic. Chalmers’s argument is exactly the kind of 
thing someone who feels that there is not enough evidence to decide either way would be looking 
for. The fact that Chalmers’s argument might convince such individuals as open-minded 
materialists and agnostics would certainly help to explain why his arguments have been hailed 
and closely examined in recent years. They have the potential to tip the scales of popularity back 
the other way, away from materialism and toward dualism, though his dualism is property 
dualism rather than substance dualism. Nonetheless, it’s hard to deny that his work deserves the 
attention it has gotten. 
 Thus, Chalmers’s zombie-argument has the potential to devastate materialism. For this 
reason, it hasn’t been favorably received in all circles. Objections have been raised, especially 
regarding the positive argument. In the next section, I will mention a few of these objections, as 
well as raise a few of my own. 
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The Positive Argument 
 
 The positive argument has two premises, as we noted above. They are the conceivability-
possibility conditional statement (referred to as C-P hereafter) and the conceivability claim. 
While Chalmers indicates that he does not think there should be much resistance to C-P, there 
are many who have, in fact, objected to this premise.5 We will look at some of these objections 
first. Also, in spite of the fact that Chalmers insists that he cannot find a contradiction involved 
in conceiving of zombies, there have been many attempts to show that zombies are not, in fact, 
conceivable. We will look at some of these second. 
 
The Conceivability-Possibility Conditional 
 
 Chalmers believes that the fact that he can conceive of zombies implies the further fact 
that zombies are logically possible. Shortly we will see exactly what he means by the terms 
“conceive” and “logically possible”. Before we do, let’s look at some attempts to call into 
question his prima facie claim that since zombies are conceivable, they are possible. 
 Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin (1999) accuse Chalmers of failing to provide 
even a rudimentary proof of the conditional. They claim that he merely responds to alleged 
counterexamples, but never provides a positive argument for its being true. Moreover, they 
                                                 
5 “In our judgement, and probably in the judgement of most of the rest of Chalmers’s readers, this principle [C-P] is 
the most vulnerable component of his view” (Hill & McLaughlin 1999, 449). 
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claim, there is good reason to think that when the Cartesian intuition (which they describe as 
“modal intuitions that seem to support property dualism” (Hill and McLaughlin 1999, 447)) is 
involved, the modal intuitions which seem to support C-P are not reliable. “As we have pointed 
out, there are significant differences between the cognitive factors responsible for Cartesian 
intuitions and those responsible for modal intuitions of a wide variety of kinds. Because of these 
differences, it would be irresponsible to generalize from other cases to the case of Cartesian 
intuitions” (Hill and McLaughlin 1999, 449). Now, it should be noted that Chalmers does 
provide a very detailed defense of C-P in (Chalmers 2002). Hill and McLaughlin’s contention 
that Cartesian intuitions differ from modal intuitions is not addressed, however. 
 Another objection is raised by Dietrich & Gillies (2001). They argue, first, that Chalmers 
is committed to a Kripkean line regarding transworld identity; and second, that, given this 
commitment and  Chalmers’s notions of primary intension and secondary intension, he has no 
choice but to admit that zombies are not possible, even if they are conceivable. 
 First, they argue that Chalmers is committed to a Kripkean view of possible worlds. 
When he asks us to perform the thought-experiment of imagining our own zombie-twin, he is 
taking a stance on the issue of transworld identity. If I imagine my own zombie-twin, then I am 
imagining a possible world containing an individual which I need to be able to identify. This is 
the so-called problem of transworld identity and there are many positions people have taken in 
order to solve it. Dietrich and Gillies point out, however, that Chalmers believes the problem of 
transworld identity to be irrelevant to his enterprise. Thus, “we have that Chalmers is not a 
typical modal realist about possible worlds” (Dietrich & Gillies 2001, 368). If he were a typical 
modal realist, he would need to provide his position regarding transworld identity. But, they 
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argue, even if he’s not a typical modal realist, Chalmers needs to be some sort of modal realist. 
Since Chalmers relies on transworld identity—he needs to be able to pick out his own zombie-
twin—and does not provide his own solution to the problem of how to identify inhabitants of 
possible worlds, he must subscribe to a position very similar to Kripke’s.  
Kripke’s position concerning possible worlds is that they are stipulated. Rather than there 
being concrete possible worlds containing possible individuals, possible worlds and their 
inhabitants are stipulated. Thus, there is no transworld identity problem at all, because when we 
stipulate that we are talking about Richard Nixon, we don’t have to do any more than this. The 
stipulation is enough to establish that it is Richard Nixon whom we are discussing. 
 This is the kind of modest modal realism which Chalmers must hold, according to 
Dietrich and Gillies. As this is the case, then, “when we are imagining zombie twins, we are 
simply imagining counterfactual situations about ourselves in which we do not have qualitative 
experiences” (Dietrich & Gillies 2001, 370). 
 To proceed, we must consider Chalmers’s notions of primary and secondary intensions. 
Both notions have to do with how the reference of a term is fixed. The notion of primary 
intension corresponds to the way a term’s reference is fixed in the world where the term is being 
used. In Putnam’s twin-earth experiment, the primary intension of “water” would be the liquid 
substance contained in lakes, rivers, streams on twin-earth. The substance would be XYZ. 
Secondary intension is what we have when the term’s reference has been fixed already in the 
actual world, and the term is being used counterfactually. Thus, once the reference is fixed in the 
actual world for a certain term, such as “water,” the secondary intension does not change. 
“Water” refers to H2O in all possible worlds. 
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 According to Dietrich and Gillies, whenever we are dealing with primary intensions and 
possible world inhabitants, we have to flesh out what it is we are referring to in the possible 
world. “Water,” under its primary intension, on twin-earth would not be referring to H2O, but 
XYZ. But we would have to know how the reference is fixed on twin-earth, in order to know 
what it’s referring to. The way we would go about doing this, say the authors, would be to give 
something similar to a definite description. 
 Now, Chalmers also supposes a primary conceivability (to which we will return shortly) 
that corresponds to primary intension. Further, there is a primary possibility that corresponds to 
primary conceivability. Dietrich and Gillies contend that Chalmers must tie primary 
conceivability to primary possibility. But it is precisely this that he cannot do, given his 
distinction of primary and secondary intension and his commitment to a Kripkean position 
concerning transworld identity. 
 If it’s true that we are imagining actual-world individuals in the possible world, with the 
only difference being that the inhabitants of the possible world do not have phenomenal 
experience, then each of us may only imagine our own zombie-twin. Dietrich and Gillies note 
that Chalmers prizes the epistemic asymmetry of conscious phenomena, which implies that I 
cannot inspect some other person’s zombie-twin to see if it has consciousness. I can only inspect 
my own, since my zombie-twin is just me without consciousness. 
 The problem lies in how we flesh out the primary intension of the terms referring to 
individual zombie-twins. We may take Chalmers’s zombie-twin as an example. “From what we 
know about primary intensions it is unproblematic to say that the primary intension of 
‘Chalmers’ is ‘chalmersy stuff’ … But what is chalmersy stuff, anyway? Saying ‘Chalmers is 
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chalmersy stuff’ does not provide enough information about the primary intension of this 
concept to evaluate the possibility of the situations at hand” (Dietrich & Gillies 2001, 373). 
Chalmers would have to give something similar to a definite description, as we saw in the case of 
“water” above. What would serve as a definite description for “Chalmers?” “Now, it seems 
reasonable that whatever the description is that Chalmers uses here to flesh out the primary 
intension of ‘Chalmers’—i.e., to give substance to ‘chalmersy stuff’—it must have 
consciousness as a constituent member” (Dietrich and Gillies 2001, 373). Thus, it’s not possible 
to flesh out the primary intension of “Chalmers’s zombie-twin” without working in the notion of 
the zombie-twin’s having consciousness. 
 Dietrich and Gillies conclude, then, that since “all of this was to evaluate the logical 
possibility of counterfactual situations about ourselves, it follows that our zombie twins are not 
[primarily possible]” (Dietrich and Gillies 2001, 374). 
 Someone might question their claim that consciousness is a constituent member of any 
description of Chalmers. They don’t address this objection, though they do address the objection 
that a purely physical description would be adequate to flesh out the primary intension. Overall, 
their consideration of C-P, especially in light of Chalmers’s own distinctions, seems to raise 
plausible reasons for rejecting the conditional statement. 
 Another attempt made against Chalmers’s use of C-P is made by Joseph Levine (1998). 
Levine argues that modal intuitions are primarily "a sensitivity to the logical forms of the 
representations by which we conceive them" (Levine 1998, 450). Thus, he defines metaphysical 
possibility, in part, by stating the following, which he calls the Modal Bridge Principle (MBP): 
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  (MBP) A situation S is metaphysically possible just in case it has no accurate  
   representation that is logically inconsistent. (Levine 1998, 450) 
 
 So, the notion of possibility is extended only so far until we reach what we recognize as a 
logical inconsistency contained in an accurate representation. But having not arrived at a logical 
inconsistency, we cannot then assert that something or other is possible. "On this way of 
understanding the relation between possibility and conceivability, conceivability emerges as our 
only guide to possibility (for non-actual situations, that is), but not as a guarantee of possibility" 
(Levine 1998, 451). So, prima facie, C-P is not true. But it's not quite that simple, according to 
Levine, when it's applied to the mind-body problem. 
 The anti-materialist relies on what Levine calls the distinct property model (DPM). The 
DPM is a model which is an attempt to explain situations in which we know the meanings of two 
terms and yet must empirically discover that the two terms refer to the same object. Knowing the 
meanings of the terms alone is not sufficient for knowing that they refer to the same thing. "It is 
the distinctness of the properties through which we represent the objects/states in question, and 
the fact that these properties are only contingently related, that explains our inability to 
determine a priori that the objects/states are one and the same" (Levine 1998, 455). 
 This applies to the case of pain, according to the anti-materialist. Even if we grant the 
possibility of empirically discovering that pain just is C-fibers firing, we must also admit that the 
properties of pain and the properties of C-fibers firing will relate to one another only 
contingently. Thus, there is a possible world in which pain is not C-fibers firing, because the 
relevant contingent properties do not relate to one another in the possible world. Thus, 
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materialism is false. 
 The anti-materialist is committed to DPM, according to Levine. And if DPM is a good 
model, then the materialist is in trouble, because there would be some properties of pain which 
would be irreducibly mental. But there might be a way out for the materialist. Levine holds that 
the reference of a term is fixed by its "mode of presentation" and the contextual features of one's 
acquisition and use of the term. By "mode of presentation," he means "the means by which a 
representation connects to its referent" (Levine 1998, 457). He argues that we should take note of 
a particular distinction involved in the concept of mode of presentation—those modes he calls 
ascriptive and those he calls non-ascriptive. He cashes this distinction out thus: "An ascriptive 
mode is one that involves the ascription of properties to the referent, and it's (at least partly) by 
virtue of its instantiation of these properties that the object (or property) is the referent. A non-
ascriptive mode is one that reaches its target, establishes a referential relation, by some other 
method" (Levine 1998, 457). Levine believes that, in order to avoid the analytic-synthetic 
distinction and meaning holism, it makes sense to take modes of presentation as non-ascriptive, 
in which case, the property that fixes the reference of a term need never be known to the user of 
the term at all. But if we accept that modes of presentation are non-ascriptive, rather than 
ascriptive, then, argues Levine, DPM should be revised. "We still appeal to distinct properties 
associated with the two modes of presentation, but we drop two crucial conditions: (1) they don't 
have to be contingently related, and that's because (2) they don't have to be explicitly represented 
within the mode" (Levine 1998, 458). 
 As this revised version now seems plausible, the anti-materialist argument may be seen to 
founder on its claim that conceiving of zombies implies their possibility. "Once we allow the 
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possibility of non-ascriptive modes of presentation for qualia, the inference from the conceptual 
possibility of zombies to their metaphysical possibility is undermined" (Levine 1998, 458). Since 
there is a logical inconsistency involved, it may be true that zombies are conceivable, but, 
according to Levine's characterization of metaphysical possibility, they may not be possible. The 
possibility of zombies is not entailed by the fact that one can conceive of them. 
 A slightly different approach to attacking C-P is taken by Peter Marton (1997). Marton 
charges not that C-P is false, but that it’s actually too strong for what the anti-materialist wants to 
accomplish. He begins by claiming that "zombists" are committed to an S5 semantic model. The 
S5 model is the one in which "relative possibility is taken to be an equivalence relation; that is, it 
is a relation that is reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive" (Loux 1979, 24). As this is the case, 
the anti-materialist conclusion which zombists push would lead to the following: If materialism 
is false, then it is necessarily false. Since the phenomenal does not supervene on the physical in 
the actual world and since the accessibility relations between the actual world and possible 
worlds are symmetric, the phenomenal will not supervene on the physical in any possible world. 
And this would lead to the statement that materialism is necessarily false. 
 But if materialism is necessarily false, then it is impossible. If materialism is impossible, 
then it is inconceivable, based on the contraposition of C-P itself. The zombist paints 
conceivability as cases in which the imagining of something does not contain explicit 
contradiction. Chalmers himself makes statements reflective of this characterization. Thus, the 
fact that materialism is inconceivable entails that there is an explicit contradiction involved in 
imagining its being true. The burden of proof, by the zombist's own admission, falls on one 
claiming that an imagined scenario contains an explicit contradiction. Therefore, the zombist 
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would have to produce proof of a contradiction’s being involved in entertaining the likelihood of 
materialism's being true. Marton does not believe that this can adequately be done.  
 Thus, Marton does not argue that C-P is false or misapplied. It's actually too strong to 
accomplish the zombist's needs. The zombist does not want to put herself in the same 
predicament she puts the materialist in—having to produce contradictions in order to refute 
arguments. But she does just this, when she utilizes C-P. In the end, she is hanged by the same 
rope that she had cut for the materialist. 
 Now that we have seen that there are some rather plausible objections to C-P, I will 
provide two arguments of my own regarding whether conceivability is a good guide to 
possibility. 
 
The Self-Undermining Feature of C-P 
 
 My first argument relies on the fact that, if C-P is true, then it is necessarily so. I will 
discuss why I think this is plausible shortly. For now, I will present my argument, assuming that 
C-P is necessarily true. If C-P is necessarily true, then its negation would be impossible. There 
would be no possible world in which C-P is false. A fortiori, the negation of C-P would be false 
in the actual world, as the actual world is just one of the possible worlds. But as we have just 
seen, there are several individuals (not including Marton) who believe strongly enough that C-P 
is false to argue for their belief. How could they believe C-P is false, unless they could conceive 
of its being false? There has to be some content to their belief, and the content would have to be 
fine-grained enough for them to be able to imagine its being false. They provide rich descriptions 
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of their beliefs in their respective arguments. But, if C-P is necessarily true, if true at all, and its 
negation is impossible, then what these people are conceiving would be impossible. If they are 
conceiving of C-P's being false, while the falsity of C-P would be impossible, then this would be 
a counterexample to C-P itself. Thus, far from being necessarily true, it would actually be false, 
at least in the actual world. 
 Now, I am not only relying on C-P's being necessarily true, if true at all; I am also 
assuming that at least some of the individuals who believe C-P is false are really conceiving of 
its being false. An opponent might object to this, however. If C-P is necessarily true, they might 
say, then how could anyone possibly conceive of its being false? They might argue that what I 
have demonstrated is not that conceiving of C-P's being false actually undermines C-P itself, but 
that putative conceivings of its being false are not conceivings at all. One person’s modus ponens 
is another person’s modus tollens. They might further argue that, before Kripke, some people 
thought they were conceiving of water's not being H2O. Now we know that, given its secondary 
intension, "water" necessarily refers to H2O. So people were not conceiving of water's not being 
H2O, but something that seemed to be water, but wasn't. The same thing might be happening 
here. The individuals whose arguments I outlined above may be conceiving of something they 
believe is C-P's being false. In fact, since C-P is necessarily true, they cannot be conceiving of 
this at all. 
 In order to respond to this objection, I will need a good definition of "conceivable." In the 
next section, I will consider possible definitions in the search for an adequate one. I will 
postpone my reply until then. 
 I still need to provide an argument for why I think Chalmers, and anyone using C-P, 
21 
would be committed to its being necessarily true. I won't be attempting an argument that 
establishes certainty on this matter. Rather, there will a lot of hand-waving and reasons why I 
believe my claim is plausible. 
 First, we should note that it is widely accepted by those who make conceivability 
arguments that if C-P is true, we should be able to know it a priori. If our knowing C-P depended 
on experience, then it might be the case that we just haven't observed its failure to hold. In other 
words, there could be cases in which conceivability does not imply possibility that we just never 
observe. If this were true, or even possible, however, then we could not move from epistemic 
possibility to metaphysical possibility. Our failure to know of the cases in which C-P fails would 
not ensure that there are none. Whether C-P is a priori or not I will not decide here. Suffice it to 
say that people who make arguments that utilize C-P generally accept that it is a priori. Chalmers 
definitely seems to take C-P as an a priori statement. 
 But does its being a priori imply that it is necessary?6 We know, post-Kripke, that the 
concepts "a priori" and "necessary" do not completely overlap in the actual world. There are 
necessary a posteriori statements. There are a priori contingent statements. This doesn’t call into 
question the fact that most a priori statements are necessarily true. What was debunked by Kripke 
was the claim that a priori statements just were necessarily true statements. And vice-versa. We 
don’t have to deny that there is a close relation, however. It seems fairly uncontroversial that 
most a priori statements which we might make are necessarily true statements. And vice-versa. 
So, it is not implausible to suggest that if C-P is taken to be a priori, it should be taken as 
                                                 
6 For a good discussion of this issue, see (Bonjour 1998). 
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necessarily true.7 
 Are there reasons for thinking that it is plausible that Chalmers is committed to C-P's 
being necessarily true? I think that, in relation to Chalmers's zombie-argument, there is reason to 
think that he depends on its being necessarily true. If C-P were a priori, but contingent, then it 
would not be the case that C-P is true in every possible world. In other words, there would be 
possible worlds in which C-P is false. Furthermore, there wouldn't be any conclusive reason for 
thinking that the actual world happens to be one of the worlds in which C-P is true. Chalmers 
cannot be satisfied with that. His strategy is to establish that zombies are possible in virtue of the 
fact that they are conceivable. If C-P were only contingently true, then it might be the case that 
the conditional is not true specifically in relation to the zombie-argument. We don't know 
whether zombies are possible without the aid of C-P. Thus, the consequent might be true or false. 
If C-P is only contingently true, then the fact that zombies are conceivable would not imply their 
being possible. At least, we wouldn't know this for a fact, unless we already knew whether 
zombies are possible. Each instance of the conceivability of an object leading to the possibility of 
the object would confirm our belief that C-P is true. But there could arise a counterexample at 
any moment. Thus, C-P in relation to the zombie-argument would just be undetermined. 
Chalmers might have the option of claiming that the conceivability of zombies makes their 
possibility highly likely. But he needs more than mere high likelihood. 
 So, it seems plausible, to me at least, that Chalmers is committed to the claim that C-P is 
necessarily true. If he does hold this, then he has to argue that anyone who would claim that C-P 
                                                 
7 As I said above, I am not trying to decide whether C-P is a priori. I argue that Chalmers and those using C-P are 
committed to its being a priori. Taking that as established, I then proceed to argue that the fact that they are 
committed to its being a priori suggests that they would also be committed to its being necessarily true. 
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is not true would not be conceiving of C-P's being false. If they are conceiving of its being false, 
they are conceiving of an impossibility, which would actually refute C-P by itself. But it seems 
rather quick to make the flat-footed claim that anyone who opposes C-P is actually mistaking an 
inconceivable scenario for a conceivable one. 
 
 
The Yablo-Chalmers Picture of Conceivability and Goldbach’s Conjecture 
 
 My second argument against C-P will begin by our considering what Chalmers has in 
mind when he uses the word "conceivable." He relies much on (Yablo 1993), so I will sketch 
Yablo's discussion of the term and shift to Chalmers's discussion when the need arises. 
 Yablo begins by considering whether "conceivability" is equivalent to "believability." He 
notes that in daily conversation, we often conflate the two terms. In philosophical contexts, 
however, we hardly ever mean "believability" when we use the word "conceivability." For, he 
says, if conceivability entailed believability, "then whenever one was certain that something was 
not the case, one would be unable to conceive it even as a possibility!" (Yablo 1993, 11) And if 
believability entailed conceivability, then we would run into trouble whenever we came across 
cases in which we do not have enough evidence to conceive of a proposition being true, but we 
could perfectly well believe that the proposition is true. These would be cases in which the truth-
value of a proposition is not yet known. Yablo uses as an example Solomon and a test that Sheba 
sets up for him. Before him are a real flower and a wax flower. He is then told to pick the real 
one, without smelling or touching it. Before Solomon enlists the aid of a garden bumblebee, he 
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does not know which flower is real. But he can perfectly well believe that the flower-like object 
before him, which, it turns out, is the artifact, could sprout flowers. Now, he does not have 
enough evidence to know which is which, so he is not conceiving of the artifact before him as 
sprouting flowers. He is undecided about which is the real flower. But this does not mean he 
cannot believe that it can sprout flowers. This is what Yablo calls an impure example, because 
the proposition stating that the object which turns out to be the artifact should sprout flowers is 
not positively inconceivable. Pure examples are much more difficult to produce. 
 Another argument that Yablo makes for this point is that, if we were to think of 
conceivability strictly as believability, and we tried to plug that conception directly into C-P, 
then we would actually get cases in which the less evidence we have for a proposition, the more 
likely it is that it's possible. This is not right, however. So conceivability should not be thought of 
merely as believability.8 
 Finally, Yablo arrives at what he believes is close to what we mean when we use the term 
“conceivable.” He writes, “I find p conceivable if I can imagine, not a situation in which I truly 
believe that p, but one of which I truly believe that p” (Yablo 1993, 26). So, conceivability is to 
be understood as a certain kind of imagining. But what kind of imagining? He makes the 
distinction between two kinds of imagining: propositional and objectual. Propositional 
imagining is imagining that. Objectual imagining is imagining perceptually. Thus, I can imagine 
                                                 
8 This might seem like a viable objection to my claim above that the fact that many people have objected to C-P 
indicates that they believe that C-P is false which, in turn, indicates that they can conceive of C-P’s being false. 
Yablo’s point, however, is not that believability never implies conceivability. He just wants to make it clear that the 
two concepts can be untied. This is not to say that there isn’t a fairly constant co-instantiation of believability and 
conceivability. More to the point, however, is that philosophers would not haphazardly make objections which they 
believe to be good ones, without having a clear conception of what they are arguing. At least, ideally. 
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that today is Tuesday, and this would be propositional imagining. I can imagine a Tuesday spent 
in the Jardin du Luxembourg, replete with green grass, pigeons, sparrows, and lounging French 
people, and this would be objectual imagining. Oftentimes we do both. I can imagine, at the 
same time, that it’s Tuesday and all of the rich details in the Jardin du Luxembourg. This would 
be a case in which I was imagining in both of the ways Yablo describes. 
 Taking these distinctions, Yablo then arrives at a more solid description of conceivability. 
“Conceiving that p is a way of imagining that p; it is imagining that p by imagining a world of 
which p is held to be a true description” (Yablo 1993, 29). 
 Now we must move from Yablo’s discussion to Chalmers’s, because Chalmers wants to 
make further distinctions concerning our use of the term “conceivable”. The purpose of making 
these further distinctions is clear: “By making these distinctions, I think at least one plausible and 
defensible conceivability-possibility thesis can be formulated, free of any clear counter-
examples,” (Chalmers 2002, 146).9 
 The first distinction is between prima facie and ideal conceivability. Something is prima 
facie conceivable when it is conceivable on first appearances. “That is, after some consideration, 
the subject finds that S passes the tests that are criterial for conceivability” (Chalmers 2002, 147). 
Something is ideally conceivable when it’s still conceivable, even after ideal rational reflection. 
Chalmers cashes out ideal rational reflection as having “justification that cannot be rationally 
defeated” (Chalmers 2002, 148). Often, things will be merely prima facie conceivable without 
                                                 
9 This clearly indicates that Chalmers believes that for his conceivability argument to succeed, C-P must not fall 
prey to counterexample. His providing these new distinctions is an attempt to guard against counterexample. Thus, if 
a counterexample is offered up and C-P, in whatever form Chalmers gives it, cannot stand against it, C-P fails. 
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being ideally conceivable. Thus, a proposition could be prima facie conceivable, but not ideally 
conceivable. 
 The second distinction is between positive and negative conceivability. Negative 
conceivability occurs when “S is not ruled out a priori, or when there is no (apparent) 
contradiction in S” (Chalmers 2002, 149). Positive conceivability occurs when one can form a 
positive conception of the situation in which S is the case. Now, according to Chalmers, positive 
conceivability is similar to what Yablo describes when he talks about propositional and objectual 
imagining. Chalmers wants to add one more kind of imagining to the positive sense of 
conceivability—modal imagining. Modal imagining is, in a sense, a combination of objectual 
and propositional imagining. He writes, “[I]n this case, we have an intuition of (or as of) a world 
in which S, or at least of (or as of) a situation in which S, where a situation is (roughly) a 
configuration of objects and properties within a world. We might say that in these cases, one can 
modally imagine that P. One modally imagines that P if one modally imagines a world that 
verifies P, or a situation that verifies P” (Chalmers 2002, 151). It should be clear that this is, in a 
nutshell, Yablo’s definition of “conceivable.” Thus, Yablo’s conception is only one particular 
kind of conceivability, according to Chalmers. 
 The third distinction is between primary and secondary conceivability. Primary 
conceivability occurs “when it is conceivable that S is actually the case.” Secondary 
conceivability occurs “when S conceivably might have been the case” (Chalmers 2002, 157). 
These distinctions correlate roughly to Chalmers’s notions of primary and secondary intension, 
outlined above. 
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 Now we are in a position to answer the objection proposed earlier to my claim that I am 
actually conceiving of C-P being false, when it would be necessarily true, if true at all. Chalmers 
might argue that I am engaged in prima facie positive primary conceiving when I claim that I can 
conceive of C-P’s being false. Consequently, my conceiving of C-P’s being false would not 
imply that it’s possible that C-P is false. But I cannot find a contradiction, even upon rational 
reflection. I can imagine necessary statements being false. After all, I can imagine impossible 
states of affairs. I think I can imagine God creating a stone too heavy for himself to lift. He 
waves his hands, a stone appears; he then stoops to pick it up, groans, grabs at his back, and 
shakes his head. Why then could I not imagine C-P’s being false? I can imagine a situation in 
which someone conceives of zombies, and then finds out later that there is a logical contradiction 
involved in hypothesizing zombies. I simply cannot find any contradiction in imagining C-P’s 
being false. Thus, it would seem that my conceiving would actually be ideal. If so, then the 
objection made earlier really doesn’t weaken my argument.  
So how do these distinctions affect our understanding of the zombie-argument? 
According to Chalmers, the kind of conceivability we are talking about in relation to zombies is 
ideal, primary, positive conceivability. And this kind of conceivability, he contends, does imply 
possibility.10 Prima facie conceivability, he admits, is not a good guide to possibility. Thus, the 
strategy one might adopt in order to attack the zombie-argument would be to try to show that 
                                                 
10 It might be argued that this claim cannot be defeated, because ideal rational justification can simply be extended 
out as far as one wishes. Since the justification is deemed ideal, then, if zombies are possible, ideal reflection 
probably would bear out the possibility. To claim that zombies are ideally conceivable would necessarily imply that 
zombies are possible. Then the question arises as to whether zombies are ideally conceivable. (We will answer this 
question shortly.) If this is how Chalmers wants the story to go, however, then his statement that there is one kind of 
conceivability-possibility thesis that is not open to counter-example is seen to be empty. Of course, if we define 
conceivability in this way, possibility will necessarily follow! We might object then that defining conceivability like 
this doesn’t answer the original question, which had to do with conceivability in the ordinary, unrefined sense. 
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zombies are not ideally conceivable. This would present a problem, however. He writes, 
“[D]efeating ideal conceivability will require an a priori entailment from physical to 
phenomenal, which requires that phenomenal concepts can support that entailment” (Chalmers 
2002, 197). He doesn’t believe that this can be done. 
 Let’s return, for a moment, to a case which Chalmers believes is only prima facie 
positively conceivable—the case involving Goldbach’s Conjecture (GC). If GC is true, then it is 
necessarily true. If it is false, then it is necessarily false. Thus, if I can conceive of its being true, 
when it is actually false, or conceive of its being false, when it is actually true, then I can 
conceive of its being true and its being false, even when it is only one or the other. Even if I 
don’t know whether GC is true or false, the fact that I can conceive of its being true and I can 
conceive of its being false implies that I am conceiving of something that is impossible.11 If this 
is the case, then we have a counterexample to C-P. 
 Now, according to Chalmers, what I am doing when I think I am conceiving of GC is 
imagining there being a lot of evidence for GC’s being true (or false). He writes, “The case 
where one conceives of mathematicians announcing a proof of Goldbach’s conjecture (or its 
negation) is best seen as a case where a superficial prima facie positive conceivability judgment 
is undermined by a moment’s reflection” (Chalmers 2002, 160). When we reflect on what we are 
imagining, we find that we are not imagining GC’s being true (or false), but only a situation in 
which there is justification for accepting either. 
                                                 
11 Of course, one would have to accept the principle of bivalence, too, for if GC were supposed to be neither true nor 
false until we discover its proof or refutation, then I would be merely imagining a proposition as being true when in 
fact it is neither true nor false. But if GC is neither true not false, then it certainly could not be necessarily true or 
necessarily false, at the moment when I imagine its being true or false. I take it, however, that the principle of 
bivalence is still widely accepted. 
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 According to Yablo, the problem is in the detail which we are imagining. Let’s say that 
when we conceive of GC’s being true, we are imagining a computer spitting out a proof. And 
when we conceive of GC’s being false, we are imagining a computer spitting out a 
counterexample. Yablo then asks, if we don’t know whether GC is true or false, how can we 
know that the proof (or counterexample) is correct? “Am I to imagine it set out in convincing 
detail? But if the detail is only imagined to be convincing, it does nothing to increase my actual 
confidence in the proof’s correctness?” (Yablo 1993, 32) But, if the detail that we need is 
actually imagined, then we have simultaneously imagined the actual proof (or counterexample). 
If that were the case, then the proof (or counterexample) is there to be produced and the person 
imagining GC’s being true (or false) has actually proved GC true (or false). What this shows, 
however, according to Yablo, is that GC is not inconceivable or conceivable, but undecidable. 
 Of course, Chalmers wishes to say that it’s merely prima facie conceivable, not 
undecidable. We should note here how the evaluation of GC relies on the grain of detail which is 
required. When we imagine a bunch of mathematicians announcing that GC has been proven, 
this is too coarse-grained. Even when we imagine seeing a proof of GC, say from a computer 
output, this is still not fine-grained enough. In fact, it might be argued, we will never be able to 
conceive of GC’s being true (or false) in the way that Yablo and Chalmers would accept, until 
GC is proved true (or false). Presumably, someone would have conceived of it before that—the 
person or group of persons who discover the proof. But, according to Yablo’s and Chalmers’s 
description, it would have to be a simultaneous conceivability and discovery. 
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 So, let’s accept that the case of GC is prima facie conceivable, primarily because the 
grain-level of imagining which would be required in order for us to conceive of its being true (or 
false) is simply not possible, without knowing beforehand whether GC is true or false. 
 What about the grain-level required in order to imagine zombies? Is the situation any 
different between the zombie-argument and the GC-case? According to Chalmers, the only way 
one could demonstrate that zombies are not ideally conceivable is to show an a priori entailment 
from the physical to the phenomenal. Chalmers contends that demonstrating this entailment from 
the physical to the phenomenal cannot be accomplished, while it has been shown, via the 
zombie-argument, that the a priori entailment does not hold. The zombie-argument was intended 
to show that the a priori entailment does not hold; turning to this fact, however, in order to 
buttress the zombie-argument is circular. The best that can be said here would be that the a priori 
entailment has not been established. But it hasn’t been refuted, either. 
 Chalmers puts the cart before the horse. His zombie-argument is intended to show that 
since zombies are conceivable, they are possible. That zombies are ideally conceivable, however 
has not been established. The zombie-argument is supposed to show that science is wasting its 
time as it operates on the assumption that consciousness may be explained in physical terms, but 
it seems more likely that science will have to determine whether consciousness may be explained 
in physical terms before we can determine whether zombies are ideally conceivable.  
Chalmers seems to rely on the mysteriousness of consciousness I mentioned at the 
beginning, in order to bolster his claim that ideal reflection does not produce a contradiction. The 
fact is—we don’t know whether the physical entails the phenomenal. But science appears to be 
prepared to eventually give us this answer. 
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Similarly, GC has not been proved or disproved, and we don’t know which proposition—
that GC is true or that GC is false—is necessarily true and which is necessarily false. The truth-
value of GC is undetermined. We don’t reason from our being able to conceive of GC’s being 
true to the assertion that it’s possible for GC to be true, for the simple reason that, if GC is false, 
then it’s necessarily false. We wait for the mathematical world to tell us whether GC is true or 
false. And if they never tell us, we take that fact as evidence that we will never know which of 
the two propositions is ideally conceivable. 
 I contend that the zombie-argument is relevantly similar to the GC-case. In the GC case, 
one of the scenarios is coherent, though we don’t know which one. In the zombie-case, we don’t 
know whether the physical entails the phenomenal. If it doesn’t, then zombies are possible. If it 
does, then they aren’t. But, as this is the case, how can we call zombies positively ideally 
conceivable and not call the scenarios of GC ideally conceivable? Zombie-arguments are in the 
same boat as GC scenarios. We don’t want to say that both GC scenarios are ideally conceivable. 
Consequently, zombies are prima facie conceivable. As Chalmers admits that prima facie 
conceivability is not a good guide to possibility, his argument does not succeed. 
 I hope that it is clear that I am not really calling into question whether zombies are 
conceivable, at least, in the context of Chalmers’s distinctions. I think that we can conceive of 
zombies at a coarse-grained level. But, by Chalmers’s own admission, this kind of conceivability 
does not imply possibility. So, I don’t think that the first premise, “If zombies are conceivable, 
then zombies are possible,” is true. 
 To recap the section: there are several arguments against C-P. I present two arguments of 
my own. The first points out that, if C-P is necessarily true, if true at all, then it actually 
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undermines itself, for it is possible to doubt whether C-P is true. And to doubt whether C-P is 
true is to conceive of its being false. But if it is necessarily true, if true at all, then one’s 
conceiving of its being false serves as a counterexample. Thus, C-P is either false or not 
necessarily true. I argue that, in order for C-P to do the metaphysical work Chalmers intends it to 
do, he is committed to C-P’s being necessarily true. Thus, C-P is false. 
 My second argument relies on Chalmers’s distinction between prima facie and ideal 
conceivability. He believes that prima facie conceivability is not a good guide to possibility. 
Further, he argues that the zombie-argument is ideally conceivable. I argue that the zombie-
argument is relevantly similar to cases where we can conceive of Goldbach’s conjecture being 
true, when it’s actually false, or where we can conceive of its being false, when it’s actually true. 
Chalmers contends that Goldbach’s conjecture cases are only prima facie conceivable. Thus, I 
conclude that the zombie-argument is only prima facie conceivable. Consequently, the 
conceivability of zombies does not lead to their being possible. 
 There are some compelling arguments which attempt to refute Chalmers’s claim that 
zombies are conceivable. We turn now to those. 
 
Conceivability of Zombies 
 
 Even if it’s true that conceivability implies possibility, Chalmers’s argument is in trouble 
if zombies are, in fact, not conceivable. We will look at just a few attempts which have been 
made to show that zombies are inconceivable.  
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 Daniel Dennett writes, “[W]hen philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they 
invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining 
something that violates their own definition” (Dennett 1995, 322). Dennett goes on to consider 
what he calls a “zimbo”, which is defined as “a zombie equipped for higher-order reflective 
informational states.” In other words, the zimbo has a particular faculty that acts functionally as 
consciousness is supposed to. Then, he asks the believer in zombies whether these zimboes are 
conscious, after all, or whether the thing they hypothesize is missing in zombies is even relevant 
to the mind-body problem at all. His objection to zombies is along functionalist lines. Can we 
fully imagine zombies as behaviorally, functionally, and psychologically identical to people of 
the actual world? Or are we imagining zimboes, which do possess something which functions 
like consciousness? 
 A more specific objection to the conceivability-claim can be found in a paper by Allin 
Cottrell. He asks what is it that we are supposed to be imagining when we imagine a zombie? 
The instructions Chalmers gives us—imagine something physically identical to an actual world 
human, but dark inside—is not clear. The best conception we might produce, according to 
Cottrell, is the following: “A zombie, then, is like a person on the outside, but just like a rock on 
the ‘inside’” (Cottrell 1999, 7). But the problem occurs when we try to tie these two facts 
together in a coherent whole. “The task is somehow to hold in our heads simultaneously the 
notion of normal human behavior, on the one hand, and internal nullity, on the other” (Cottrell 
1999, 8).  
 Normally, we are able to tie concepts together. Someone might ask us to imagine 
unicorns. We would do so by imagining a horse and imagining a horn and combining the horse 
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and horn into a coherent imagined creature. We could then “see” the creature we have imagined 
and verify that both the concept of “horseness” and “hornedness” are evident in the picture. But 
can we do the same thing in the case of zombies? Cottrell says no. 
 
In the first two cases considered above, we concluded that the burden of proof 
would rest with anyone claiming that the putative conception (unicorn, sawdust 
man) was not  properly conceivable. One reason for this conclusion was that in 
those cases it was possible to construct an external ‘verification’ of the 
consistency of the conception. … But note that no such verification is possible, 
even in principle, in the case of the zombie.  (Cottrell 1999, 8) 
 
 Now, it might be objected to Cottrell’s description above that he is attending to the 
objectual imagination only. If he were to utilize the notion of propositional imagining, then he 
would see that imagining normal human behavior could be done objectually, while imagining 
internal darkness would be propositional, i.e., imagining that there is nothing going on 
phenomenally inside. There would seemingly be no problem, until one were to ask what is meant 
by the proposition, “There is nothing going on phenomenally inside.” In other words, part of 
conceiving of the zombie would be understanding the proposition which would accompany the 
imagining. But, in order to understand the proposition in the present context, one would have to 
know how the normal human behavior could be instantiated while there is nothing phenomenal 
going on inside. Thus, the problem Cottrell points out would still exist. 
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 An even more persuasive argument against the conceivability of zombies can be found in 
the paper “Why Zombies are Inconceivable” by Eric Marcus. Marcus attacks Chalmers on his 
own turf, as it were, showing how zombies are not primarily positively ideally conceivable. 
Marcus begins his attack by distinguishing between third-person differences and first-person 
differences. He explains what he means by these terms in the following: “To imagine Abe 
Lincoln third-personally is to imagine, for example, the way his parts are laid out in space. To 
imagine him first-personally is to consider how the world appeared to him, to imagine what he 
felt, experiencing his moods, and so forth” (Marcus 2004, 56). According to Marcus, the 
difference we are asked to imagine in conceiving of zombies is first-personal.  
 In the zombie thought-experiment, the difference is between the presence of 
consciousness in actual world beings and the absence of consciousness in the zombies. Marcus 
asks, however, “But what is it to imagine first-person absence?” Third-person absence is 
possible. We have a background of  presence to measure it against. But first-person absence is 
not analogous. “There is no inner border or background of inner space against which it is 
possible to conceive subjective absence. Imagining subjective absence presents an 
insurmountable obstacle. On the one hand, it is something that we are to imagine from the first-
person point of view … On the other hand, there is nothing that it’s like to be subjectively 
absent” (Marcus 2004, 57). 
 So, if we are to do as we are asked, we would have to imagine ourselves experiencing 
nothing. But this seems self-contradictory. The problem, according to Marcus, is that imagining 
zombies requires imagining nothing. So, “to ‘imagine’ a zombie is not really to imagine at all” 
(Marcus 2004, 57). Thus, upon ideal reflection, we discover that zombies really aren’t 
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conceivable. They were, however, apparently conceivable. So, they were prima facie 
conceivable. But what deceives so many into thinking that they are conceivable? 
 Marcus argues that “those who take themselves to imagine zombies are mistaking not 
imagining something for imagining nothing” (Marcus 2004, 58). They think they are imagining a 
lack of consciousness when actually they just aren’t imagining consciousness. The former cuts 
some metaphysical ice, as Marcus puts it. The latter does not. 
 Thus, Marcus concludes the following: “Although there is a sense in which we can 
imagine a physical and functional duplicate of our world without consciousness, ‘without 
consciousness’ modifies the act, rather than the object of imagining” (Marcus 2004, 48). We 
could imagine a molecule-for-molecule duplicate of the actual world without imagining 
mountains, planets, plants, etc. But we cannot imagine a molecule-for-molecule duplicate of the 
actual world which does not contain mountains, planets, plants, etc. The latter is simply not 
possible. Thus, if we imagine a zombie-world, we are imagining a world physically identical to 
our own without imagining consciousness being a part of it. This does not imply that 
consciousness is non-physical. 
 The above arguments—especially Marcus’s—seem to me compelling. While I myself do 
not argue that zombies are not conceivable, I do have the same intuitions as those above, evident 
in my claim that zombies are only prima facie conceivable. Thus, I find Chalmers’s positive 
argument for zombies lacking, and weakened by the above arguments. So, if there is any hope 
for the zombie-argument, it will have to reside in the version that I am calling the burden-of-
proof argument. It is to this that we now turn.  
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The Burden-of-Proof Argument 
 
 We began our discussion of the zombie-argument by noting that Chalmers really makes 
two arguments for zombies: the positive argument and the burden-of-proof argument. These two 
arguments are significant for many reasons, but primarily for their conclusions—the statement 
that zombies are logically possible. For reference, I will include Chalmers's argument against 
materialism again, so that we can see that the conclusion regarding zombies is present as premise 
2: 
 
1. In our world, there are conscious experiences. 
2. There is a logically possible world physically identical to ours, in which the positive 
facts about consciousness in our world do not hold. 
3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are further facts about our world, over and above 
the physical facts. 
4. So, materialism is false. (Chalmers 1996, 123) 
 
 At this point, we should take note of an important difference between the positive and 
burden-of-proof arguments.  We considered several objections to the positive argument. But they 
attempted to show not that the conclusion is false, but that it's not established by the premises. 
The claim that zombies are possible is consistent with the falsity of both C-P and the 
conceivability-claim. The positive argument can fail, while the argument against materialism 
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succeeds. How so? Premise 2 can be true even if the positive argument does not succeed. So a 
refutation simpliciter of premise 2 will not be achieved just by refuting the positive argument. 
But if we were to refute the  burden-of-proof argument, premise 2 would be irrefutably false. Of 
course, there are at least two ways one can refute a burden-of-proof argument: show how the 
burden of proof is misplaced or show how the argument itself just does not work. I will be 
attempting the second way. 
 Recall that Chalmers has set up the argument against materialism in the following way: 
None of the premises alone establishes the anti-materialist conclusion. They work in concert, so 
that, if they are all true, the conclusion is supposed to logically follow. Premise 1 is not 
controversial. Premise 2 supports premise 3, so if we want to know whether premise 3 is true, we 
will have to determine whether premise 2 is true. Thus, we must determine whether premise 2 is 
true or not, by Chalmers's own design. He obviously counts on the positive argument for 
zombies to demonstrate that premise 2 is true. We have seen that the soundness of the positive 
argument is doubtful. So, as a final effort, Chalmers would have to rely on the burden-of-proof 
argument, which states that zombies are logically possible until proven otherwise. The burden of 
proof is on the person who claims that zombies are not logically possible. 
 So we have to keep in mind two things here: (1) Chalmers places the burden of proof on 
an opponent, so that zombies are possible unless proven impossible. (2) Chalmers relies on his 
audience assenting to each and every premise in order to establish the anti-materialist conclusion. 
The intended audience—primarily consisting of agnostics and open-minded materialists—is not 
going to merely assent. Most members of the intended audience willing to entertain Chalmers's 
argument against materialism are going to attempt to do just what Chalmers indicates must be 
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done: they are going to try and prove that zombies are not logically possible. Some, but not all, 
will agree, having not proven zombies impossible, that zombies may be assumed possible. But 
very few are going to accept that zombies are possible, without conducting some research of 
their own. 
 What sort of research will be needed? Presumably one would want to investigate whether 
there is a contradiction involved in hypothesizing the existence of zombies. What sort of 
contradiction would one seek? I contend that, despite what Chalmers says about conceptual 
contradictions being required, logical contradictions are what an opponent would have to 
produce. If someone were to provide a logical contradiction associated with the postulation of 
zombies, then zombies would be incontrovertibly impossible, and the burden-of-proof argument 
would fail. It is not so clear that the burden-of-proof argument would fail as a result of a 
demonstration of a conceptual contradiction. After all, there are countless propositions and states 
of affairs that are logically possible, but not conceivable. 
 How is the search for the contradiction to be conducted? Presumably, one would perform 
a reductio ad absurdum—assume that zombies are possible and then show how this assumption 
leads to a contradiction. The next step would be to figure out what the contradiction would look 
like. It can't be just any contradiction that we seek. While it may be the case that our discovering 
one logical contradiction entails all contradictions, the initial contradiction cannot be placed in 
the context of the physical world, which serves as background in possible world Z. In order to 
entertain Chalmers's thought-experiment, we have to stipulate that the physical facts in world Z 
are identical to the physical facts of the actual world. If we happen to produce a logical 
contradiction, then it does not matter whether the stipulation is then violated. But we cannot 
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violate the stipulation upfront, by allowing in contradictions that are unrelated to the postulated 
zombie-twin. Thus, the one contradiction we should seek cannot be one that is unrelated to the 
zombie-twin, even if, after having produced the contradiction, all contradictions follow. This is 
all in line with keeping to the terms that we accept when we agree to perform Chalmers's 
experiment. 
 So, let's see how it goes then, trying to prove zombies logically impossible, in order to 
decide whether we should assent to premise 2 above. Let's assume that zombies are possible. 
This allows us to posit the existence of the zombie-twin of an individual of the actual world. 
Chalmers seems to be quite attached to and protective of his own zombie-twin, so let's posit the 
existence of another. Take the zombie-twin of my cat, Louie.12 In possible world Z it is true that 
p, where p is the statement, "There is a creature physically identical to Louie that lacks 
consciousness." The statement p would have the form  
 
(1) ∃x(Ix & Lx); (There exists an x such that x is physically identical to    
 Louie and lacks consciousness.) 
 
 
Statement (1) seems to be the most obvious and appropriate statement that is true in Z and not 
true in the actual world. Having assumed that zombies are possible, and having made the claim 
that there exists a zombie in Z, we would then need to try to show that in world Z there is a 
                                                 
12 We may assume for the sake of argument, contra Descartes, that animals are conscious beings, and, also, that the 
kind of consciousness we are discussing is relevantly similar to Louie's. 
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logical contradiction. Since (1) is the statement we have determined to be the most relevant to Z, 
we would then try to prove the negation of (1). This would be the statement 
 
(2) ∼∃x (Ix & Lx); (There does not exist an x such that x is physically    
 identical to Louie and lacks consciousness.) 
 
 
 
The most probable way one would arrive at (2) would be by showing that zombies cannot exist 
in Z. Whether this would be best accomplished by relying on actual world science or some other 
method we won't try to decide here. 
 Statement (2) is logically equivalent to 
 
(3) ∀x(Ix ⊃ ~Lx); (For all x, if x is physically identical to Louie, then it is  not the case 
that x lacks consciousness.) 
 
 
Thus, we would need to prove this statement, or a logically equivalent version of it, in order to 
show that our original assumption leads to a contradiction. 
 What exactly does proving (3) involve? I.e., what would someone wishing to prove 
statement (3) have to demonstrate? Basically, (3) just says that being physically identical to 
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Louie is sufficient to produce consciousness. Thus, to prove (3), one would have to prove that 
nothing that has the physical make-up identical to Louie’s could fail to possess consciousness. 
One main thesis of materialism states that the physical structure of the brain is sufficient to 
produce consciousness. In fact, the zombie-argument is an attempt to refute this thesis. But (3) 
seems to be a restatement of this thesis. The upshot, then, is that one who wishes to prove (3), 
thereby providing a negation of (1) and a logical contradiction, would have to prove a central 
claim of materialism. Since Chalmers's argument against materialism relies on its premises being 
true and forcing the conclusion, the only way to halt the argument's progress toward its 
conclusion would be to prove this central claim of materialism true. In other words, the only way 
to prove Premise 2 false is to prove the conclusion false. But, Chalmers's intention was to get us 
to assent to Premise 2, giving us no choice but to accept the conclusion. Therefore, since we are 
supposed to assent to the second premise before assenting to the conclusion, and furthermore, 
since we have to assent to the conclusion before we assent to the second premise (because of the 
above demonstration), we never arrive at the conclusion ... or we arrive at it before we begin. In 
other words, Premise 2 does not support the conclusion at all, or it begs the question. 
 Chalmers is faced with a dilemma. Either premise 2 does not support the conclusion at 
all, because the truth-value of the conclusion would have to be determined before the truth-value 
of premise 2 could be determined; or premise 2 begs the question against materialism, because in 
order to ascribe a truth-value to premise 2, we would have to assume that a central thesis of 
materialism is false. Let's assume that premise 2 does support the conclusion, in order to see how 
the argument against materialism would be circular. If premise 2 supports the conclusion, then 
we must be able to determine that it is true. But as we have seen, in order to determine that 
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premise 2 is true, we would have to ensure that premise 2 cannot be falsified. To falsify premise 
2, we would have to establish that materialism is true. So the only way for us to establish premise 
2 as true, in light of the positive argument's not working, would be to demonstrate that we are 
unable to prove false the anti-materialist conclusion. Thus, a central thesis of materialism has to 
be assumed false in order for premise 2 to be judged true. But the conclusion is supposed to 
follow from the premises, not the other way round. Therefore, if we determine that premise 2 is 
true, as we would have to do if premise 2 supports the conclusion, then we would have to first 
establish that the anti-materialist conclusion is true. Thus, if premise 2 supports the conclusion, 
then the entire argument is circular. 
 If Chalmers wants his argument to be non-circular, then he will have to admit that 
premise 2 does not support the conclusion. But premise 2 is crucial to the establishing of the 
conclusion. Thus, his argument against materialism fails, our having shown that the positive 
argument does not succeed and the burden-of-proof argument only leads to the dilemma we have 
presented above. 
 My point in this section has been an epistemological one: how can we know that premise 
2 is true? But Chalmers has framed his argument such that we would have to know whether 
premise 2 is true in order to see that the anti-materialist conclusion has been established. Since 
the positive argument for premise 2 does not succeed, Chalmers has only the burden-of-proof 
argument to appeal to. This argument does not work, either, because when we begin to 
investigate whether premise 2 is true, we see that there is no way to determine that zombies are 
logically possible without first conceding that materialism is false.  
 So, I hope it is clear that, in spite of the fact that I am making an epistemological, rather 
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than metaphysical,  point regarding the zombie-argument and its place in the argument against 
materialism, the point directly impacts Chalmers’s argument. He sets up the burden-of-proof 
argument in such a way that it depends on his audience believing that each premise is true. Once 
the investigation begins, however, it becomes clear that the premise does not support the 
conclusion. In fact, it’s the other way round. 
 There are problems with Chalmers’s positive argument for zombies. There are problems 
with Chalmers’s argument for zombies. At least, so I have argued. One might think that I would 
be content in leaving the situation as it is, concluding that Chalmers’s zombie-argument, and his 
argument against materialism, which depends on the zombie-argument, are hopelessly flawed. I 
intend to raise one more objection to Chalmers’s zombie-argument. I will argue that the zombie 
thought-experiment is misguided from the very beginning. Work done on consciousness will not 
be furthered by zombie-arguments or any similar thought-experiments. Indeed, they only serve to 
consume time which would be better spent attending to more relevant things. 
 
The Inherent Uselessness of the Zombie-Argument 
 
I will begin this section by providing an analogy to Chalmers's zombie-
argument/argument against materialism. It will be relevantly similar to Chalmers's arguments, 
but relevantly different, as well.  
 I call the following the "dullard-argument". It goes like this: 
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(1) Imagine a world physically identical to the actual world whose inhabitants are 
physically, behaviorally, and functionally identical to the inhabitants of the actual world. 
They work, they play, they sleep, they have families, etc. Anyone observing these 
creatures going about their daily lives would be unable to detect any difference between 
them and their actual world counterparts. 
(2) Further imagine that, in spite of the fact that these possible-world inhabitants are 
behavioral isomorphs of the inhabitants of the actual world, they never experience any 
enthusiasm. They are dullards. Possible-world Dad takes possible-world son to the Red 
Sox game—son talks about getting excited, fidgets in the car seat on the way to the game, 
smiles continuously. If you ask him whether he is enthusiastic about going to the game, 
he will reply, "Sure am." But, in fact, he is not experiencing enthusiasm, because 
enthusiasm does not exist in this world. 
(3) It seems that I can imagine this, without any apparent contradiction. 
(4) If I can imagine this, then it is possible. 
(5) Therefore, there is a possible world in which everything is physically the same as the 
actual world, but where something is missing in the possible world. 
(6) Therefore, materialism is false. 
 
This is a compressed analogue of Chalmers's zombie-argument/argument against materialism. 
 Now, the dullard-argument seems to me to be analogous in certain, significant ways to 
the zombie-argument. We are asked to postulate a world physically identical to the actual world. 
Then, we are to stipulate that something that exists in the actual world does not exist in the 
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possible world. Further, we are then compelled to admit that the actual world contains something 
which the possible world does not. Finally, we are to conclude that materialism is false. 
 It might be argued that the dullard-argument works so closely to the way the zombie-
argument works that it also is an effective way to refute materialism. But there are some relevant 
differences between the dullard-argument and the zombie-argument, as well. 
 First, enthusiasm is not a state of consciousness. How can this be proven? Let’s assume 
for the moment that zombies are conceivable. We can imagine a world in which every human-
like creature is physically identical to the humans of the actual world and none of the human-like 
creatures possess consciousness. Moreover, let’s imagine a particular zombie—my zombie-
twin—sitting on his couch one afternoon, watching TV, and eating potato chips. Suddenly, the 
zombie leaps up, brushes crumbs off his chest, and announces loudly to anyone who is around, 
“Today, I resolve to get back into shape!” He throws away all his junk food, enrolls in a health 
club, begins jogging regularly, completely changes his diet. Whenever he has any free time, he 
engages in some aerobic activity. What’s worse, he begins to beleaguer his friends and family 
with admonitions regarding their own lifestyles. One day, they cannot take it anymore, and they 
confront him, telling him that if he doesn’t moderate his behavior resulting from his newly 
adopted way of life, he will soon be healthy, but all alone. 
 Would we not describe the zombie’s behavior as enthusiastic? I think we would ascribe 
enthusiasm to the zombie. But if the zombie exemplifies enthusiasm, and, by definition, does not 
possess consciousness, then enthusiasm is not a phenomenal state. Therefore, even if the dullard-
argument were to be accepted as sound, it would not establish that consciousness is non-physical. 
At best, it would establish that there is something that is non-physical. 
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 This brings us to the second difference between the dullard-argument and the zombie-
argument. If we can describe even a putative zombie as a creature displaying enthusiasm, then 
it’s fairly clear that we typically mark enthusiasm by behavior and not by some underlying 
mental state. If this is the case, then it’s also the case that whenever behavior that typically marks 
enthusiasm is present, we have no reason to believe that enthusiasm is not present. Even if we 
observed someone exhibiting typically enthusiastic behavior and we received from the person 
sincere denials of an underlying enthusiasm, I think we would still describe the behavior as 
enthusiastic and might even question whether the person truly understands the word 
“enthusiasm.” 
 So, to return to the dullard-argument, we recall that behavior that seems enthusiastic is 
present in the possible world. If what I have said above regarding enthusiasm is correct, then the 
possible world does contain enthusiasm, in spite of the fact that I mistakenly thought that I was 
able to conceive of a world identical to our own in which enthusiasm is missing. Thus, the 
conclusion is not established. 
 We know that it makes no sense to imagine enthusiastic behavior without imagining 
enthusiasm. We know beforehand that there is a conceptual contradiction involved. This is the 
crucial difference between the dullard-argument and the zombie-argument. As I noted before, we 
don’t know whether there is a conceptual contradiction involved in hypothesizing zombies. This 
is why it seems immediately absurd when we confront the dullard-argument and does not seem 
so absurd when we confront the zombie-argument.  
 Now, Chalmers might respond by pointing out the fact that I have just shown that my 
thought-experiment involves prima facie conceivability, not ideal conceivability. After some 
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reflection, I am able to see that I cannot, in fact, coherently imagine a world physically the same 
as the actual world, but containing no enthusiasm. Thus, this is no analogy to the zombie-
argument. We should recall the point made earlier, however, that Chalmers depends on the 
mysteriousness of consciousness to strengthen his claim that zombies are ideally conceivable. In 
the dullard-argument, it seems pretty obvious that imagining the possible world is not coherent. 
We don't know enough about the nature of conscious experience to judge whether the zombie-
argument is ideally conceivable or not. This doesn't weaken my claim, however, that the dullard-
argument is a viable analogue of the zombie-argument. 
 Let's look at a similar attempt to show how the zombie-argument is flawed. Dennett 
(1995) sets up a comparison with the concept "health." We can perform a thought-experiment 
similar to the zombie-argument and the dullard-argument. First, we are asked to imagine a world 
a portion of whose inhabitants engage in activities which would require robust health in the 
actual world. Then, we are to make the stipulation that these people are not healthy, according to 
the thought-experiment. Thus, there seems to be a mystery. They can do things like climb Mt. 
Everest, swim the English Channel, and yet not be healthy. Of course, Dennett does not think 
that there is a mystery at all—here or in the zombie-argument. He writes, "But the mystery 
would arise only for someone who made the mistake of supposing that health was some 
additional thing that could be added or subtracted to the proper workings of all the parts” 
(Dennett 1995, 325). But, Dennett claims, health just is the proper working of all the parts of the 
body. Consciousness works the same way, he argues. “Supposing that by an act of stipulative 
imagination you can remove consciousness while leaving all cognitive systems intact … is like 
supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination, you can remove health while leaving all 
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bodily functions and powers intact. … Health isn’t that sort of thing, and neither is 
consciousness" (Dennett 1995, 325). 
 Dennett makes the good point that consciousness is the wrong kind of thing to stipulate 
out of existence. His answer, however, is to define it functionally, as we do with health. I will not 
be adopting a functionalist position, but rather a deflationist position. I put forth a deflationist 
position, not because I don't find any mystery associated with consciousness, but for quite the 
opposite reason. I believe that the mystery of consciousness paralyzes us in some ways, so that 
we are afraid to proceed with the relevant research. And this paralysis manifests itself in empty 
activities, like thought-experiments that serve no purpose other than to keep the field 
preoccupied with questions of ontology. I recognize that there is still an explanatory gap between 
experience itself and the underlying mental processes of the brain. I further recognize that 
conceptual work is undertaken, in part, in order to close the gap. But if we have to greatly amend 
our conception of consciousness—as we would have to do if we are to consider consciousness as 
non-physical—as a result of these thought-experiments, then, I would argue, the gap doesn't get 
smaller, but larger, and we waste time in making the problem more intractable by bad research. 
 
A Deflationist Description of “Consciousness” and its Relation to the Zombie-Argument 
 
 In addition to the problem I have just discussed regarding the analogy of enthusiasm, I 
now will argue, first, that current philosophy of consciousness needs a cohesive, agreed-upon 
description of the concept “consciousness;” and second, that the kind of description which is 
called for will not be such as to allow the zombie-argument to proceed as Chalmers would like it 
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to.  
 There are several levels of disagreement in contemporary philosophy of consciousness. 
First, there is disagreement regarding which experiences we should refer to as conscious. When 
one uses the phrase "conscious experience," it's not always clear what one means. Some 
philosophers conflate the terms "conscious" and "aware," so that one's experience of a shirt 
collar's rubbing the back of the neck would not count as conscious, if one were not aware of it at 
anytime. Also, when one is driving late at night and suddenly realizes that she has driven several 
miles without being aware of it is a case in which the driver was not conscious of driving. David 
Armstrong calls into question whether we really want to ascribe to drivers the ability to drive 
without being conscious of driving, at least at some level. Other philosophers make the 
distinction between being conscious and being aware. Ned Block distinguishes between 
phenomenal consciousness (or P-consciousness) and access-consciousness (or A-consciousness). 
P-consciousness is the qualitative experience of, say, seeing a sunset. A state is A-conscious if it 
is open to direct control of thought and action. (Block 1995, 381-382) Thus, one may be in either 
state, or both, and still be said to be having conscious experience. 
 Then there are the problem-cases in which there is no clear intuition as to whether a 
person is having conscious experience or not. One such case is that of blindsight. People with 
particular kinds of brain-damage report that they cannot see anything in one hemisphere of their 
visual field. They sincerely believe that they see nothing but darkness. Yet they are able to make 
guesses as to what appears in the half of their visual field which is supposedly dark with much 
better than chance accuracy. Thus, there is some evidence that they are "experiencing" something 
in the dark half, even if they are not aware of what it is. Another kind of problem-case is that of 
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individuals who have undergone brain surgery in order to alleviate unbearable amounts of pain 
localized to particular parts of their body. Afterwards, the patients report that they still know that 
they have the pain where the pain was originally. They still experience the pain in some way that 
they cannot really describe. They don't feel the pain, however. There is no immediate, non-
inferential quality to the pain after the operation. There is some quality, however; otherwise, they 
would simply report the total absence of the pain post-surgery. And they seem to be experiencing 
this quality, even though they are not feeling the pain. These are just two of several kinds of 
cases in which it’s difficult to decide whether experience is conscious or not. 
 So the question of which experiences to refer to as conscious is an open one. Some 
believe that we should not focus on the problem-cases, opting instead to attend to the cases 
which we pretheoretically refer to as "conscious experience." This position would state that, 
since we all know what kinds of experience should be referred to as "conscious," there really is 
no problem. Let's try to explain them, rather than the cases on which we cannot agree. But then 
there is the opposing position which simply denies that we have a good pretheoretical notion of 
"conscious experience." Thus, no headway is made at all. 
 The second prevalent disagreement probably derives from the first. If we cannot answer 
the question, “Which of our experiences properly fall under the term ‘conscious experience?’” 
then we likely will not be able to answer the question, "What does the term ‘consciousness' 
mean?" There are several disciplines working independently to resolve the problems associated 
with consciousness. Within each discipline, there are several distinct approaches to the problems. 
But, in fact, there is no agreed-upon definition of the thing these individuals are supposed to be 
researching. Flanagan writes, "There is no single orthodox concept of consciousness. Currently 
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afloat in intellectual space are several different conceptions of consciousness, many of them 
largely inchoate. … The picture of consciousness as a unified faculty has no special linguistic 
privilege, and none of the meanings of either ‘conscious’ or ‘consciousness’ wear any 
metaphysical commitment to immaterialism on its sleeve. The concept of consciousness is 
neither unitary nor well regimented, at least not yet” (Flanagan 1992, 13). 
 According to Crick, "Everyone has a rough idea of what is meant by consciousness. It is 
better to avoid a precise definition of consciousness because of the dangers of premature 
definition. Until the problem is understood much better, any attempt at a formal definition is 
likely to be either misleading, or overly restrictive, or both" (Crick 1994, 20). But we have 
already suggested that perhaps everyone's rough idea of what is meant by consciousness is a bit 
too rough. When we try to make the distinctions that science must make in order to investigate, 
the pretheoretical conception of consciousness may have to go.  
 Moreover, Güzeldere notes that there is no one problem of consciousness. He writes that 
the trouble may lie in "the fact that what passes under the term consciousness as an all too 
familiar, single, unified notion may be a tangled amalgam of several different concepts, each 
inflicted with its own separate problems" (Güzeldere 2002, 7). Furthermore, since consciousness 
is being investigated more and more in an interdisciplinary fashion, it is crucial that better 
characterizations of consciousness be arrived at. "After all, if we hope that anything toward a 
better understanding of consciousness will come out of the joint efforts of different disciplines, it 
is of utmost importance to minimize crosstalk and make sure that common terms actually point 
to the same referents. As a result, it seems even more imperative to look for and try to delineate 
the specific conceptions and aspects of consciousness under which the different problems arise" 
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(Güzeldere 2002, 8). 
 Despite the fact that Crick maintains that a formal definition would be premature—and 
we can agree with him on this point—it does not seem warranted to go on and uphold the 
pretheoretical notions of consciousness as adequate. As Güzeldere points out, we must 
disambiguate some of the tangled concepts associated with conscious experience. Perhaps an 
attempt at defining "consciousness" would be too ambitious, but a description of the concept 
seems in order to facilitate future relevant research.  
 I intend to provide a negative description—saying what “consciousness” is not—in order 
to eliminate the positions which are not useful at all for scientific research. Thus, I will have little 
to say about which of our experiences are conscious, what qualifies as falling under the concept 
“consciousness.” My goal is to move us closer to thinking of “consciousness” in a different way 
from what we have before. 
 Consider the breadth of experiences that we typically describe as conscious experience. 
There are mundane experiences—looking at a stoplight, hearing a co-worker talk about inflation, 
tasting the glue on the envelope flap. There are slightly more interesting experiences—hearing a 
child babble, feeling the smoothness of a polished stone, tasting baklava. Then there are the truly 
unique and enriching experiences—hearing a Beethoven sonata, tasting a perfectly aged 
Camembert, watching the sun set over the Grand Canyon. All three groups contain experiences, 
but there doesn’t seem to be much similarity between members of one group and another. In fact, 
there is a rather obvious difference—of degree. Presumably, one has a fuller experience of the 
child’s cooing than one does of the co-worker’s rant. One has a fuller experience of the sun 
setting than one does of the taste of envelope glue. So it seems rather questionable to group all of 
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these experiences—which differ greatly in degree—together under one term, “consciousness.” 
 Not only is there a difference in degree, there is a difference in kind between various 
experiences. Consider the sensory modalities. We say that seeing a hamburger is a conscious 
experience in the same breath as we say that tasting a hamburger is a conscious experience. But 
there is a great difference between seeing and tasting. In fact, if we really try to compare the two 
modalities, it seems impossible to draw any correlations.13 Seeing is completely different from 
tasting. And even if one sense (e.g. sight) seems to be more closely related to another (e.g. touch) 
than it does to a third (e.g. taste), this does not indicate that there are any similarities at all 
between the two seemingly more closely related senses. Thus, there is a difference in kind 
between the sensory modalities. 
 What about within a particular sensory modality? Is there a difference in kind between 
hearing a car horn and hearing a horn blast a resonant note in a symphony? If there is only a 
difference in degree, then there would just be some element in the hearing the car horn that was 
either more or less present in the hearing the symphony’s horn. Is this the case? 
 I don’t have the space needed to fully deal with the latter question. I will only say that 
there seems to me to be little similarity between the experience of hearing a car horn and the 
experience of hearing a note blasted in the middle of a symphony. Of course, some may be not 
agree with me, and claim that they perceive very little difference between the two. This could be 
because I am wrong or simply because those who disagree simply aren’t perceiving a real 
difference that is present. 
                                                 
13 I am ignoring those instances in which metaphors seem to indicate an overlap of modalities (i.e., tasting green or 
smelling purple.) Also, I am disregarding reports of synesthesia, for these kinds of experiences are outside the scope 
of this paper. 
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 So, there are differences between the cases that we pretheoretically consider conscious 
and the marginal cases. There are differences in degree between certain mundane experiences, 
slightly less mundane experiences, and truly unique, edifying experiences. Moreover, there are 
differences in kind between the sensory modalities. And it seems plausible to suggest that there 
are some differences in kind even within the individual sensory modalities. With all these 
differences between various events we describe as experience, why do we feel tempted to refer to 
them all as “conscious experience?” 
 I don’t believe that "consciousness" is a truly unifying term. That is, I believe that 
“consciousness” does not pick out a common property that all experience possesses. It refers to 
the set of phenomena I have just described as wildly heterogeneous. So when we use the word 
"consciousness," we are not committing ourselves to a position in which there is a common 
characteristic which pulls all conscious experience together. It is a façon de parler, a device that 
enables us to speak about diverse phenomena, without enumerating them one by one. Since there 
is no "common thread" woven throughout all conscious experience, there is no reason to think 
that we can discuss "consciousness" in any coherent way, without discussing the fact that there is 
no unifying characteristic. 
 I suggest, therefore, that we think of "consciousness" as a family-resemblance term. 
Since there is no common characteristic belonging to each and every conscious experience, we 
should not use the term "consciousness" as though it referred to a collection of experiences 
marked by a unifying characteristic. This is not to say that nothing is referred to by 
"consciousness." We refer to the various experiences that we suspect are conscious. Science will 
bear out our suspicion or it will not. But, as a consequence of my deflationist description—
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deflationist  because it is an attempt to remove some of the unnecessary mysteriousness 
surrounding consciousness—science will not be investigating one natural kind … consciousness. 
It will be investigating several kinds, each with its own particular set of problems, as Güzeldere 
suggests should be the case.  
 So, to recap: there are intuitions regarding what experiences are conscious, but some have 
called into question whether they are reliable. Thus, intuitions get us moving, but they may 
misguide us at a certain point. We have to exercise some constraint. This is why I provide a 
deflationist picture of consciousness, as a negative description. Consciousness is not 
homogeneous. We have noted just how heterogeneous the collection we refer to as 
“consciousness” is. There is no common thread running through all conscious experience. To 
suppose there is would be to limit our description of conscious experience too much. As Crick 
notes, formal definitions at this point would likely be misleading or overly constrictive. I hope 
that the sketch I have provided is not misleading. I contend that the conception of consciousness 
that most philosophers trade on is indeed misleading, because consciousness is seen to be some 
uniform substance or property which brings together various experiences, so that they all share 
something in common—namely, being conscious experience. But this is circular and no help. I 
am rather confident that my sketch is not overly restrictive. Some may even accuse me of 
providing such a vague description that it does us no good, gets us no closer to a working 
definition. But I have not tried to provide a working definition. I have merely tried to describe 
the concept in a different way from the more common attempts. 
 Now, I have been arguing that my description of "consciousness" would be helpful in 
coming to an agreement on what we mean by "consciousness." Further, my conception seems to 
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fit in quite nicely with science's investigation of conscious experience. Neuroscience does not 
just study consciousness, simpliciter. It takes experience kind by kind. That is, it studies auditory 
phenomena, visual phenomena, gustatory phenomena, tactile phenomena, olfactory phenomena. 
It even studies and compares different experiences within the sensory modalities. It studies 
cognition, memory, and other mental processes in relation to phenomenal experience. Science 
proceeds piecemeal. My description of the concept "consciousness" seems more amenable to the 
scientific method of investigation than does a description that tries to lump all experience 
together via some particular common property. 
 What connection is there between my deflationist description and the zombie-argument? 
First, I would argue that Chalmers seems to be committed to consciousness being something 
uniform. He asks us to imagine that there is no consciousness in zombie world Z, without giving 
us much in the line of what he means by "consciousness." Thus, we don't know which position 
described above, if any, he subscribes to. If my suggestion is plausible, then the zombie-
argument may be considered in light of the deflationist description. 
 So, let's assume that the deflationist description is a good one—no common characteristic 
may be articulated of conscious experience. Chalmers asks us to perform the zombie thought-
experiment. We then come to the part where we are to stipulate that there is no consciousness in 
world Z. Now, however, we are at a loss as to what to do. We have no criterion for deciding what 
experience we are to stipulate out of existence. Chalmers asks us to imagine all conscious 
experience as being absent. This assumes that we have some way of deciding which experiences 
are conscious and which are not. Earlier I suggested that science will provide a lot of answers to 
this question, but it hasn't yet. Moreover, Chalmers will not accept such a reliance on science, 
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because he believes that science needs to adopt new laws in order to explain consciousness. We 
aren't imagining a science with psycho-physical laws here, however. Thus, he is not going to 
want to wait on science to help in determining what kind of experience we are stipulating the 
absence of in world Z. 
 Chalmers asks us to propositionally imagine p's being true, where p is the statement, "In 
world Z there is no conscious experience." But in order for me to be able to imagine p's being 
true, I have to understand it, I have to know what it means to say that there is no conscious 
experience in Z. Does the phrase "conscious experience" contain unaware experience, like the 
collar's rubbing on the back of the neck? Or informationally rich, but phenomenally poor 
experience, like blindsight? But why would it include these kinds of experience? If there is no 
unifying characteristic common to these kinds of experience and, say, phenomenal experience, 
then why would we stipulate that they do not exist? It seems that Chalmers owes us an 
explanation of why we should imagine these kinds of experience as being absent from Z, and not 
other kinds. 
 Maybe he would just respond by saying, "All right. I am not asking you to imagine the 
absence of unaware experience or blindsight. I am only asking you to imagine the absence of 
phenomenal experience, the kind that we seem to all agree is conscious experience." But we have 
seen that even in relation to the experience we pretheoretically describe as conscious, there are 
wide differences. Why would we lump together smelling a rose with tasting envelope glue? Why 
does he include hearing a sleeve ruffle in the same class as hearing Mozart’s Requiem? It seems 
he still owes us an explanation as to why it’s these experiences that we should all agree are 
conscious. 
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 But maybe he doesn’t need any more than one experience. Perhaps he could just say, 
“Fine. I will not ask you to imagine a world bereft of several kinds or degrees of experience. I 
will only ask you to imagine a world physically identical to the actual world in which a token 
visual experience, which occurs in the actual world, is absent. It only takes one instance in which 
the physical does not entail the phenomenal for my conclusion to stand.” 
 So, let’s try this limited version of the zombie-argument. Imagine the possible world in 
which everything is physically the same as the actual world, but the visual experience I have of 
the screen before me is absent. My zombie-twin does not have the visual experience that I now 
have. Does this establish that materialism is false? 
 Actually, this seems like a straightforward scientific question. Can this token event of 
seeing the screen be fully explained in physical terms? Is the biological process that occurs when 
I am confronted with the computer screen sufficient to produce the phenomenal event of my 
seeing the screen? Why would scientific evidence need to be weighed against the finding of 
Chalmers’s now-limited zombie-argument? The more limited the range of experience Chalmers 
is forced choose from, the more likely it is that science will be able to provide some answers to 
the question of whether it’s possible for the physical processes to occur without the phenomenal 
experience. This limited new argument that Chalmers would have to adopt is not going to have 
the far-reaching implications he intends his original argument to have. 
 Thus, the zombie-argument gets no grip if we use the deflationist description of 
consciousness. This in itself I count as a strength. But I have given other reasons for supposing 
that there is no characteristic common to all conscious experience, independent of the zombie-
argument. Thus, if one were to find my independent reasons good ones, the consequence of the 
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zombie-argument's losing its clutch on us would just be a bonus. 
 As I have made clear above, I believe that the zombie-argument, at its core, is not at all 
useful. I do think, however, that my negative description of consciousness is useful. I offer it up 
not because I don't find consciousness mysterious and elusive, but precisely because I do. 
Almost anyone who seriously considers conscious experience does, as well. It is incredibly 
mysterious, almost to the point of inexplicability. Almost. As I noted at the beginning of the 
paper, my position is not mysterian. I believe consciousness will be explained. But it will be 
explained piecemeal, each kind of experience studied separately, because many kinds will have 
to be explained in different ways. To think that consciousness as a whole will be explained via a 
cohesive, overarching theory is to engage in oversimplification. How then should consciousness 
be studied? 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I believe that the correct method for studying phenomenal experience is something 
similar to what Owen Flanagan describes in Consciousness Reconsidered. There he writes 
 
I propose that we try the most natural strategy, what I call the natural method, to see if it 
can be made to work. Tactically, what I have in mind is this. Start by treating three 
different lines of analysis with equal respect. Give phenomenology its due. Listen 
carefully to what individuals have to say about how things seem. Also, let the 
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psychologists and cognitive scientists have their say. Listen carefully to their descriptions 
about how mental life works and what jobs consciousness has, if any, in its overall 
economy. Finally, listen carefully to what the neuroscientists say about how conscious 
mental events of different sorts are realized, and examine the fit between their stories and 
the phenomenological and psychological stories. (Flanagan 1992, 11) 
 
Notice that Flanagan does not advocate a complete disregard for phenomenology. The 
neuroscientists may explain every detail of the brain and still be susceptible to charges that the 
explanatory gap is still there, and as wide as ever. That is why we must include the “what it’s 
like” element in research done on consciousness. Similarly, we should not eliminate the 
investigation of what function certain cognitive capacities have. If we were to do that, we might 
be missing a vital piece of the puzzle. The natural method, as Flanagan calls it, would require 
each of the three lines. Ignoring any one of them would be to our peril. 
 Also notice that Flanagan does not include thought-experiments in his vision of a good, 
useful method for studying consciousness. 
 Where does that leave the zombie-argument? Recall that if it’s correct, then science as it 
stands will need to be overhauled, so that it can make room for non-physical entities in the 
world. The natural method does not seem to be taking into account any sort of overhaul of 
science. Indeed, it seems to be committed to a physicalist picture. So what’s to be done? 
 According to John Searle, thought-experiments like the zombie-argument are 
counterproductive and even pernicious. In order to answer arguments for dualism, one must 
accept the vocabulary of the dualist, which poisons the discourse from the start. “In denying the 
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dualist’s claim that there are two kinds of substances in the world or denying the property 
dualist’s claim that there are two kinds of properties in the world, materialism inadvertently 
accepts the categories and the vocabulary of dualism” (Searle 1994, 54). So, rather than getting 
on with the hard work of pursuing the explanations of particular phenomenal experience, 
materialists have to defend against attacks like Chalmers’s zombie-argument. But, in the process, 
they have to assume the kind of language that will not be helpful in the relevant research. And 
so, they consume a lot of time and energy which would be better spent in other areas. 
 I believe Searle is right here. These kinds of arguments have no place, or at least no 
significant place, in philosophy of mind. I think matters of ontology, reflections on what kinds of 
things there are in the world, have a place in metaphysics, but in the philosophy of mind, I think 
it’s a serious neurosis we should be cured of, once and for all. 
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